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SUMMARY
One of the few real examples that exist of cooperative control
of a relatively fast (compared to economic systems) system occurs in the
depth control loop of a submarine. Two operators sit side by side viewing
essentially similar displays in an arrangement that is much llke a conven-
tional aircraft cockpit. One of these operators has direct control of the
forward planes and the other has direct control of the stern planes. By
tradition each is assigned a distinct control task; the forward planesman
controls depth and the stern planesman controls pitch (attitude).
Obviously these controls are not independent and a high degree of coupling
exists. ::
The most difficult task the depthkeeping team must face occurs
during periscope-depth operations during which they may be required to
maintain a submarine several hundred feet long within a foot of ordered
depth and within one-half degree of ordered ptich. The difficulty is
compounded by the facts tb-t wave generated forces are extremely high,
depth and pitch signals are very "noisy" and submarine speed is such
that overall dynamics are slow.
In late 1979 we began a study leading to a mathematical
simulation of the depthkeeping team based on the optimal control
models that have proved successful in many other applications.
This wozk will be described, including a solution of the optimal ""
team control problem with an output control restriction (limited
display to each controller).
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TI. INTRODUCTION
Modern submarines bear little resemblance to their NN I and II
ancestors. Prior to the advent of the nuclear age, submarines were
basically enclosed surface ships capable of submergence for short periods
of time and substantially faster on the surface than below. A typical
modern submarine is built to operate and function totally submerged for
essentially indefinite periods. Circular cross section tmlls and improved
hydrodynamic shaping has resulted in a reverse of the NN II standards and
the new subs are much faster below the surface than while surfaced.
Despite substantial advances in almost every other area of sub-
marine operation, steering and diving control procedures have changed
relatively very little over the years. True the displays are high
reliability devices and the planes/rudder hydraulic systems are faster
and quieter but man functions in the loop much as he did before. In
fact, the steering and diving control of a modern U.S. Navy submarine
is one of the few examples of a team effort for the control of a small
dynamic system. In this paper we will discuss the most demanding of
the functions of the steering and diving team; that is, accurate main-
tenance of depth, trim (p_tch), and heading while operating at periscope
depth in a heavy sea way; and our efforts to mo6el their procedures. The
renainder of this paper contains the following material:
Section II describes the Near-Surface Depthkeeping (NSDK)
control problem in more detail and discusses the roles
of the team members.
Section III describoq an Optimal Control Modeling approacl.
for solution of this problem.
Section IV presents the results of a preliminary experimen-
tal study and describes the follow-on efforts.
iI. THE SUBMARINE CONTROL PROBLEM
Over the past several years we have been investigating many
aspects of submarine control including display effects and workload.
However, the moat difficult task, from the operators' viewpoint, is
the periscope depth operation. There are several sources of difficulty
including:
(I) Control of a large physical system (perhaps 300 to 400
feet) with very slow dynamics.
(2) A narrow operational band; too deep and observation
capability is lost, too shallow and detection may
result.
(3) The presence of extremely large disturbance forces due
to sea waves. These are of two types: first order forces
which resemble zero-mean, narrow band, Caussian processes;
and second order forces which resemble the first order
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processes past through a square law detector (squaring
device). The second order forces always act upwards and
tend to "suck" the submarine towards the surface.
(4) The presence of (relatively) high frequency noise on
all displays which is the direct or indirect result of
first order wave action.
(5) A relatively low skill level and rating (compared to
pilots of military aircraft) of the helmsman/planesmen.
In order to cope with these difficulties the U.S. Navy has
evolved a procedure that has as its goal the de-coupllng of the f
primary control axes of depth, pitch and heading. There are five
personnel involved in the near-surface deptbkeeping (NSDK) operation
whose duties and responsibilities are as follows:
Officer of the Deck: The OOD is generally responsible for the
overall well being of the ship. He will issue orders
directly to the Diving Officer of the Watch for depth
and trim. He also issues orders directly to the helms-
man for heading control. A typical set of orders would
be: "Helmsman, xx degrees right rudder, steady on course
xxx degrees." The helmsman replies: "Helm aye" and
then, when the course _s reached, "Steady on course
xxx degrees."
Diving Officer of the Watch: The Job of the DOOW is to attain
and maintain ordered depth. He does this be exerting
direct control over three other personnel--the stern
planesman, the fairwater planesman, and the Chief of
the Watch. One of his ma_or roles is training and
admon ition.
Chief of the Watch: The COW is in charge of the Ballast Control
Panel (BCP) and he ballasts and trims the ship in response
to orders from the DOOW. He does this moving water
fore and aft (for trim) and to and from the sea (for
ballast).
Stern Planesman: The role of the stern planesman is to maintain
shlp'_s angle (pitch) using the stern planes (located
near the rudder) in direct response to com_mnds from the
DOOW.
Fairwater Planesman: Under normal conditions the falrwater *
planesman has two separate and distinct responsibilities.
• The bridge fairwater, now called the "fairwater" or "sail" is
what was called the "connin E tower" on the older ships. The
falrwater planes are mounted on this structure so _hat they do not
extend beyond the beam of the ship.
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First, in his role as plsnesman, he will be tasked to
maintain ship's depth in direct response to orders from
the DOOW. Second, in his role as helmsman, he is
responsible for attaining and maintaining ship's heading :
in direct response to orders from the OOD.
The physical arrangement of the personnel is as follows, the
' OOD moves freely through the control room but is usually fairly near
the periscope (which is located amidships) from which position he can
observe all of the control activity. Slightly forward and to port :
(left) is the diving control station which somewhat resembles the
pilot/co-pilot seats, controls, and displays in an aircraft (no
windows, of course). The DOOW sits slightly behind and centered on
the planesmen. The Ballast Control Panel is still further to port
and the COW sits facing this panel which can also be easily monitored
by the DOOW.
The fairwater planesman's role is obviously the more difficult
of the two as he receives orders from two sources to control two
axes of motion. Fortunately the vertical and horizontal plane motions f
are only very lightly coupled and, for all practical purposes, he
may consider them to be orthogonal. However, the pitch and depth
motions are very closely coupled via the dynamics of the ship and
correction of depth errors by the fairwater planesman influence
pitch angle and the correction of pitch errors by the stern planesman
influence depth. The nature of this interaction and the manner in which
the planesman solve their problem was the primary interest of our study.
In order to focus the intensity of the effort it was decided
to attempt to model only steady state operation and exclude the
evolutions involved in coming to the surface and submerging after
the operations were complete. As a result of extensive interviews
and at-sea observation of procedures we concluded that, again emphasizing
steady state operational conditions, the OOD and the COW contributed little
to the moment-to-moment control activity. The OOD, once hav_g given
orders for depth and heading, would not interfere in the routine unless
unusual circumstances occurred. The COW, having trimmed and ballasted _
the ship to the DOOW's satisfaction, would only monitor ohip's status.
Therefore our preliminary experiments included only the DOOW and the
two planesmen.
From further observation of crews during the preliminary
experiments, augmented by further interview data, we concluded that the
role of the DOOW was primarily admonitory. That is, he intensified the
efforts of the planemen by issuing co_mands/warnlngs such as:
* Watch your depth!
* It's starting to come up!
* Maintain your angle!
and so forth. From this we concluded that, were the planesmen more
skilled, the role of the DOOW dur_n_ steady state operation would be
minimal. This was confirmed by noting that there was considerably
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less communication in low sea states than in high sea states and that
little or no communication occurred between the DOOW and the planeemen
when the planesmen had considerable experience. The DOOW transferred
his much more extensive skill and experience to the planesmen and also •
served to motivate them should their attention lag. Therefore, we
reasoned, the model could take into account the effects of the DOOW
by simply employing a sllghtly higher "skill factor" or attention
parameter than would otherwise have been used. The DOOW was also
eliminated from the modeling procedure.
Having reduced the diving team to its two essential members it
only remained for us to quantify the nature of the inter-relatlonshlps
between them. We again intended to rely heavily upon interview data
to provide insights in this regard. Indeed all of our interviewees
(most of whom had, at one time or another, actually been involved in
planesman/helmsman training) emphasized the importance of cooperation
between the planesmen. Both during training and at-sea operation,
planesmen are urged and encouraged to "cooperate" and not to "fight"
each other. However, when we attempted to pin down exactly in what way
the planesmen were to cooperate we received no satisfactory answers.
Apparently "cooperation" was a vague concept and the over-rldlng rule
was an attempt at independent control of depth and pitch. We decided
to make the tentative assumption, until the data should prove otherwise,
that cooperation, as such, was a myth. That is, while each planesman is
aware of the other's activities, he does not attempt to aid the other In
achieving his performance goals. Each planesman establlshes his own
performance goals and attempts to meet these while in control of a
dynamic system which is made up of both the ship and the other planesman.
In fact, we postulated that should the planesmen be completely isolated
from each other and from displays of the other's behavior and controlled
states, their responses would not be substantially different. Unfortu-
nately we did not have the opportunity to design and conduct a set of
experiments which would have conclusively demonstrated the truth of
falsity of that assumption.
III. FORMULATION OF THE MODEL STRUCTURE
The conclusion that cooperation is largely a myth heavily influ-
ences the resulting model structure. Beginning basically with the
Optimal Control Model (OCM) as proposed by Kleinman (Ref. I), the
model structure shown in Figure i was derived. Having had Sood success
with an OCM approach for single person submarine control in the past we
elecfed to continue along this path as far as practicable. For example,
the lack of cooperation implies that the planesmen have different perform-
ance functlonals (control goals). In addition there are other items to be
considered with regard to observation and utilization of data. The most
basic of these are summarized in Table I. In Table 2 we present further
differences between the human and the optimal controller. As these latter
limitations and differences are well known they requJze no further
elaboration at this point.
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TABLE1
COMPARISONOF OPTIMALAND HUMANTEAM STRATEGIES
DURINGNEAR SURFACEDEPTHKEEPING
OptlmalControllerStrategy Human Strategy
The optimalcontrollerconsiders The fairwaterand stern planesmen's
thatboth planesoperateIn goals (performancefunctions)are
harmonyand utilizesa single differentwhichmay resultin
performancefunctionto derive conflict.
its controllaw.
The optimalcontroller"observes" The fairwaterplanesmanobserves
all statesand uses this infor- depth informationonly and the stern
marionin the controllaws. planesmanobservespitch information
only. Neitherattemptsto construct
the othersstatesfromhis
limitedobservations.
,Theoptimalcontrollaw uses The forwardplanesman'scontrollaw
gains on all states for both uses depth and depth rate only
controllers, while the stern planesman's
controllaw uses pitchand pitch
rateonly.
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TABLE2
COMPARISONOF OPTIMALCONIROLAND HUMANLIMITATIONS
OptimalContruller Human Constraint
Optimalsystem'sobservationsare HumansobserveimperfectInstru-
"noise free" (neglecting sensor .wants and are subject to observation
noise), and indifferencethre_hbld
phenomenon.
Optimalcontrollerhas perfect Human'sknowledgeof submarine
knowledgeof submarine dynamics, dynamics ts imperfect and a
strongfunctionof trainingand
experience.
The optimal controller observes The humancan effectively observe only
all statessimultaneouslyand is one displayat a timeand must
able to utilizethe information allocatehls attentionappropriately.
so obtained.
The optimalcontrollergives Humansare subjectto lackof atten-
full "attention"to the taskat tion due to mentalfatigue,
all times, boredom,stress,or lack of
motivation.
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The structure shown in Fig,ire I is at variance with the standard
Linear-Quadratic (LQ) controller (and the human models resulting from it)
in two major respects:
(i) Each control lms its own performance function. In the
present case these are independent, ei
(2) The control law is based on a limited set of states.
The combination of these deviations from standard LQ control
theory is one aspect of team theory and/or decentralized control theory. _
While literature on these topics is easily found little or no practical
applications or solution techniques is evident. In tbe limited space
here we could not present the details of the techniques we used to solve
this particular problem. An outline of the approach may be, however,
instructive. An initial set _f gains is determined, by an appropriate
start-up technique, for one of the controllers. This set of gains, plus
th£ system open loop dynamics, represent the system to be controlled by
the other controller whose gains are then easily computed by standard i
techniques. This set of gains is then used to update th_ original guess
on the first controller's gains and the process is repeated iteratively
until sufficient convergence takes place. This iterative procedure is
embedded in a further iterative procedure (due to Wenk, Ref. 2) for
computing the optimal output control (state limited) feedback problem.
Having determined a computational procedure for solving the
requisite control problem there remained only the selection of the
various model parameters. These are:
(i) The control and state weighting matrices.
(2) The indifference thresholds.
(3) The Total Attention Parameter (TAP).
The Total Attention Parameter (TAP) is simply a divisor of the baseline
observation noise derived from previous display related experiments
(-20.0 db). By varying the TAP from unity towards zero the observation
noise increases which, in turn, decreases the performance of the model.
This decrease in performance may be thought of as arising from any of
several causes such as boredom, lack of motivation, and so forth. Based
on previous experiments we expected to be able to match the human data
with a TAP in the range of 0.5 to 0.75. The diagonal elements of the
weighting matrices would simply be the inverse of the variances of the
measured human performance and thresholds would be approximately one-half
of display graduations.
Unfortunately this straight-forward procedure did not duplicate
the experimental data available. In every case the performance of the
model was substantially superior to crew performance unless the TAP
was reduced to unreasonable levels. After a considerable period of
investigation it was concluded that the error did not reside with our
assumed model structure and gain selection procedures. However, based
to a large extent on detailed studies of strip chart records, it was
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postulated that the lower than expected performance of the crews was
attributable to a relative lack of motivation which was manifested by
higher ttmn normal indifference thresholds. Because it is not unreasov-
able to suppose that the TAP and the indifference thresholds would be
related when motivation was low, we sought to form an ad hoc relation-
ship between the two that would explain the available data. The form of
this relationship was suggested by the form of the Random Input Describing
Function (RIDF) for the threshold in the range of interest. The TAP and
the RIDF for the threshold interact in such a way as to imply that they
could be related by: _
2
Indifference Thresholdj = _i - K21(TAP)
It should be amphaslzed that this relationship was selected for mathe-
matical tractability and may have to true anthropomorphic basis.
The Kni were selected by (the admittedly) arbitrary procedure
of assuming that the normal threshold (½ major graduations) could be
used for a TAP of 0.8 and that the thresholds would be four times as
great when the TAP was 0.2. It is only necessary to vary the TAP until
the desired level of performance is attained. The validity of the
approach could only be determined by its ability to predict performance
in conditions other than that used for tuning.
IV. PRELIMINARY EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
A preliminary experiment was conducted for the purpose of pro-
viding data for model tuning. In this preliminary experiment only the
vertical plane states of depth and pitch were controlled. (The total con-
trol problem will be addressed in a later study). Eight crews controlled
a simulated U.S. Navy attack class submarine under two condJ_tlons; Sea
State A at X knots and Set State B at Y knots. For the first case the
TAP of the model was varied until the model's average RMS depth error
equalled that of the average RMS depth error of all crews. Weighting
matrices based on this condition were used to generate the data shown in
Table 3A. (All data has been normalized so that the value for the human
results is unity fo_ every variable in order to preserve the unclassified
status of this report.) By agreement with the Navy we are only required
to match pitch and depth data but we have reported control data also.
Exactly the same model parameters were used to predict performance in
the other condition, Sea State B at Y knots, as shown in Table 3B.
V. CONCLUSION
Based on the preliminary results it certainly appears that our
decision to proceed using an OCMapproach was more than Justified. The
team modeling problem can be very complex but the OCH structure allowed
us to attack the problem in a fairly coherent manner. At the present
time the Navy is planning a much more elaborate set of experiments which
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will include both depth and heading control along with other variables
to fully validate the OCM approach. Perhaps we'll be back to tell _
about this next year.
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